Privacy" (PGP), a software program developed in 1991 by Philip Zimmerman, provides a far more secure system of encryption. 21 Encryption software like PGP is both free online and simple to use. 22 The information stored on a computer or electronic storage device can also be encrypted. Encrypted scrambles the contents of an electronic storage device, making it unreadable. There are a variety of encryption methods including full-disk encryption (FDE), file and folder encryption, virtual volume encryption, and hard disk password. 23 FDE makes the entire device inaccessible and unreadable if the user does not know the correct password. 24 Once the password has been entered, the device becomes readable. 25 File or folder encryption makes individual files or folders inaccessible (e.g., encrypting "my documents"). 26 Virtual volume encryption provides protection for information stored inside of a container (e.g., one's C drive or a portable hard drive) and requires a password or key to access the container. 27 Finally, a hard disk password is much like FDE except that where FDE uses software that interacts with one's operating system, with hard disk encryption, the user's computer hardware prompts the user for a key with no involvement from the operating system. 28 While methods of cracking encryption exist, 29 one of the problems facing law enforcement is that without the passphrase to an encrypted device, decryption becomes difficult or even impossible. 30 Although MATHEMATICS TEACHER 689, 691-92 (2001) . Asymmetrical key encryption requires both a public and a private key. PAAR, supra note 7, at 6. A message encoded with a public key can only be decoded with the private key. Id. As a result, the public key can be made public without risk that a third party could use it to decode encrypted messages. Id. at 7-8. This allows one to be conveniently contacted with encrypted messages with little risk of those messages being read by another. Id. at 7-8. 21 See generally OPENPGP, http://www.openpgp.org/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2014). 22 Id. encryption can keep one's private information private, it can also bar law enforcement's attempts to investigate crimes involving computers. 31 
B. The Modern Interpretation of the Fifth Amendment
Self-Incrimination Clause
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment states, "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
32 The Fifth Amendment does not grant one an unfettered "right to remain silent." 33 Instead, before the privilege attaches, an act must satisfy three elements. The act must be: (1) compelled, (2) incriminating, and (3) testimonial. 34 A seemingly obvious, but important, point is that these elements are conjunctive. 35 The government can, therefore, compel the accused to incriminate himself or herself-so long as the compelled act is not testimonial. 36 Similarly, one can incriminate oneself with a testimonial communication, but if the government does not compel it, it is not privileged. 37 The government may also compel a testimonial act so long as one does not incriminate oneself when making it. 38 31 See sources cited supra note 2, 5. 32 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 33 See Doe II, 487 U.S. 201, 214 n.12 (1988); see, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1973) (holding that compelling one to speak for the purposes of a voice exemplar was not privileged). 34 Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004) . 35 Id.
36 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976); see, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (permitting the government to compel a defendant to provide an incriminating blood sample because it was non-testimonial); see also Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252 (1910) ("But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. The objection in principle would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover, we need not consider how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself. For when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, and even if the order goes too far, the evidence, if material, is competent."). 37 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409-10; Doe I, 465 U.S. 605, 611-12 (1984) ; see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (noting that one may waive one's Miranda rights, but the waiver must be, among other things, voluntary); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that the defendant's confession was voluntary when he approached the police during a psychotic episode and confessed to a murder). 38 See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 (subpoenas in federal civil proceedings); Fed. R. Crim. P. 17 (subpoenas in federal criminal proceedings).
Element 1: Compelled
To satisfy the compulsion element, the government must in some way coerce action. 39 When an act is done voluntarily, this element is not present. 40 For example, with a personal paper or document, the voluntary act of writing the document would not be compelled, but a government subpoena to produce the document would be. 41 Thus, if someone writes in his or her diary "I killed so-and-so" and the government seizes the diary, then the diary receives no Fifth Amendment protection because its creation was voluntary. 42 However, if the government were to coerce the same person to sign a confession saying much the same thing-or even affirm the fact that he or she wrote the diary-then the compulsion element would be present. 43 
Element 2: Incriminating
The incrimination element requires that an act either incriminate or lead to the sicvoery of incriminating evidence. 44 One does not necessarily need to have committed a wrongdoing; even the innocent may fear selfincrimination. 45 But the danger of self-incrimination must not be merely "imagined and unsubstantial." 46 Furthermore, to satisfy this element, the 39 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that to avoid the danger of compelled self-incrimination, the accused must be warned of his or her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights). 40 Doe I, 465 U.S. at 610-11; see also South Dakota v. Neville 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (holding one is not compelled to refuse an alcohol test although the results of the test tended to incriminate). 41 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409-12. In this case, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the defendant's tax records were privileged. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. In Fisher, the taxpayer's accountant produced the records and the taxpayer's lawyer was in current possession of the records. Id. The Court found that the creation tax records were not compelled because the government did not compel the records' creation. Id.
42 Cf. Doe I, 465 U.S. at 610 ("Where the preparation of business records is voluntary, no compulsion is present.") (footnote omitted). 43 Id. at 611; see also Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1924) ("[T]he requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing merely that the confession was not induced by a promise or a threat. A confession is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made. A confession may have been given voluntarily, although it was made to police officers, while in custody, and in answer to an examination conducted by them. But a confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever may have been the character of the compulsion, and whether the compulsion was applied in a judicial proceeding or otherwise.") (footnotes omitted). 44 The Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between action that is testimonial versus action that is non-testimonial. 48 Testimonial acts require one to make use of "the contents of his own mind." 49 Testimonial acts are often verbal communications used for their contents, such as statements made during custodial interrogation, 50 before a grand jury, 51 or during a trial.
52 Verbal communication will almost always be testimonial.
53
Physical or real evidence is not privileged. 54 For example, in Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court held that the privilege against compelled self-incrimination did not apply when the government obtained a ordinary course of things-not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct. We think that a merely remote and naked possibility, out of the ordinary course of law and such as no reasonable man would be affected by, should not be suffered to obstruct the administration of justice."); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 (1968); see also Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 ("The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself-his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination."). 47 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973) (" [T] he Fifth Amendment privilege is a personal privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him. As Mr. Justice Holmes put it: 'A party is privileged from producing the evidence, but not from its production.' The Constitution explicitly prohibits compelling an accused to bear witness 'against himself': it necessarily does not proscribe incriminating statements elicited from another.") ( blood sample from the defendant. 55 Even one's verbal and written acts may be non-testimonial so long as they are used for their physical characteristics and not their substantive content. 56 For example, voice exemplars 57 and handwriting exemplars 58 are non-testimonial because they are used for their physical properties and not what is said.
59
The difference between a testimonial act and a non-testimonial act is the difference between requiring a defendant to answer an interrogatory and requiring a defendant to provide a handwriting exemplar. 60 Both can incriminate him or her, but with the former, the defendant is required to make use of the "contents of his own mind." 61 Physical actions may, however, make implicit testimonial communications. 62 The following sections address the question of whether being physically compelled to produce documents is testimonial.
i. The Act of Production Doctrine
The Court has established the "act of production" doctrine in response to the issue of whether the production of a physical object (such as a personal or business paper) is a testimonial act. The lower courts have been applying this "act of production" doctrine to compelled decryption cases, so understanding it is of particular importance. 63 First, I will describe it generally and then discuss the small number of Supreme Court cases applying the doctrine.
The Court has distinguished between the content of a paper and the act of producing the paper. 64 While the content of a paper is certainly testimonial, its creation is voluntary (i.e., it lacks the compulsion element and is therefore not privileged). 65 The act of producing a paper is compelled, but whether it is testimonial is a more difficult question.
66
No bright line rule exists to determine whether the production of a paper is a testimonial act. 67 Instead it depends on the "facts and circumstances" of each case. 68 Whether the production of a paper is testimonial depends on whether that production makes implicit, testimonial communications. 69 Normally, when one produces a paper, one tacitly admits to the government that the paper exists and that one has control over it. 70 These tacit admissions may make the physical production of the paper testimonial.
71
I say "may" because the government has the opportunity to "rebut" the claim that the production is testimonial. 72 The government may "produce evidence that possession, existence, and authentication [is] a 'foregone conclusion. '" 73 In other words, the accused may claim that he or she is making a testimonial communication, but if the government already knows what the production would implicitly communicate, then the production loses its testimonial quality and becomes a non-testimonial act.
74
It is worth acknowledging that the exact meaning of "foregone conclusion" has proven an interpretative challenge because the Court has Dep hen an implicit as opposed to an explicit communication is involved, it is necessary to consider whether the government is really asking a 'question' through the subpoena. Granted, the defendant's response to a documentary subpoena always reveals that the item does or does not exist; the government cannot eliminate the implicit question about the document's existence no matter how it phrases the subpoena's demand. But if the government already knows the answer to that question and is truly uninterested in the implicit answer provided by production, the witness' gratuitous communication of it should not violate the Fifth Amendment. In short, the Fisher decision suggests that constitutional rights are not violated by implicit communications that are inherent in a response to a documentary subpoena where those communications are unwanted because, though technically admissible, they are not substantially relevant to the prosecution's case given its other evidence.") (footnotes omitted); Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1343 n.19 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating that the foregone conclusion doctrine bears a family resemblance to the independent source doctrine from use and derivative-use immunity cases); Michael S. Pardo, Testimony, 82 TUL. L. REV. 119, 188 (2007) ("The government's prior knowledge, however, may be relevant to show that it had an independent source for the information and, thus, did not make derivative use of the act of production and will not make use of it at trial. 77 See sources cited supra note 76. Several lower courts have adopted the "reasonable particularity" standard to determine when something is a "foregone conclusion." Under this standard, the government must know with reasonable particularity the location and existence of the documents it subpoenas. See United States v. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313, 324 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In Hubbell, the lower appellate court, the D.C. Circuit, had adopted the reasonable particularity standard, but the Supreme Court declined to pass judgment on its validity. been prepared by his accountant, and the taxpayer gave them to his attorney. 79 The government subpoenaed those documents. 80 The taxpayer's attorney asserted the privilege against self-incrimination on his client's behalf. 81 The Court considered the issue of whether a subpoena to produce the tax records was a testimonial act. 82 It noted that the compelled production of records does not require oral testimony or require the taxpayer to "restate, repeat, or affirm the truth the contents of the documents sought." 83 However, production of the tax records may have implicit testimonial qualities. 84 In some cases, production may implicitly communicate that the records exist and are controlled by the taxpayer. 85 Production may also authenticate the documents. 87 The Court found that the government could independently confirm and verify the existence of the taxpayer's records; the taxpayer's accountant had created the records, and the records were the kind that an accountant would normally create. 88 The production would not tell the government anything it did not already know and would not increase the "sum total" of the government's knowledge. 89 Therefore, the Court found that production of the records to be insufficiently testimonial to meet the Fifth Amendment's "testimonial" element.
90
The Fisher analysis was, apparently, part of the Court's jurisprudence all along. 91 The Fisher Court said that the "act of production" analysis even applies to things like handwriting exemplars.
92 When one provides a 79 Id. 80 Id. at 394-95. 81 Id. at 395-96. While irrelevant to this discussion, Fisher also held that, although the attorney was an "agent" of the taxpayer, under Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), the attorney could not claim the Fifth Amendment privilege on the taxpayer's behalf. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 397-98; see also cases cited supra note 49. 82 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 402-14. 83 Id. at 409; see also Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957) (holding that a grand jury could compel a custodian of records to produce a company's records but not to orally testify as to more records if that testimony could incriminate). 84 Id. at 410-11. 85 Id. handwriting exemplar, one implicitly admits that one can write and admits that what he or she is providing is his or her handwriting. 93 But the government already knows that people can write; it is a "truism." 94 And the government already knows that the exemplar is someone's handwriting; it is "self-evident."
95 Thus, the things communicated were "foregone conclusions." 96 This would mean that this act of production analysis is at work in more than just cases where one is compelled to produce documents.
b. United States v. Doe (Doe I)
Eight years later, in United States v. Doe 97 (Doe I), the Court revisited the act of production doctrine. 98 In this case, the government sought to compel records from the defendant with a grand jury subpoena. 99 The defendant claimed that the content of the records was privileged, and the act of producing the records was privileged. 100 The lower courts sided with the defense on both claims.
101
On the first point, the Court rejected the claim that the content of the records was privileged. 102 As discussed in section II.B.1, if a record is created voluntarily, it lacks the element of "compulsion." 103 The defendant argued that it should make a difference that the records in his own case were personally created, but in Fisher, the taxpayer's accountant had created the records. 104 The Court rejected this as a distinction without a difference and found that both records were created voluntarily.
105
On the second point however, the Court sided with the defendant.
106
The Court relied on the findings of the lower courts that the production would involve a testimonial communication. 107 It also sided with the lower courts' finding that the government had no knowledge of whether the exemplar is non-testimonial).
93 Gilbert, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67. 94 Id. compelled documents existed and were in the defendant's control.
108
The Court, in dicta, helped to clarify the somewhat perplexing act of production doctrine from Fisher.
109 This dictum provides a framework for the act of production and foregone conclusion analyses. 110 First the one seeking to claim the privilege must show that the compelled production has implicit testimonial qualities.
111 Then, the burden shifts to the government to rebut the claim of privilege.
112 To "rebut" this privilege, the government must produce evidence that the testimonial qualities implicitly communicated are already a foregone conclusion and therefore nontestimonial. (Doe II) , again addressing the act of production doctrine. 115 As part of a grand jury investigation, the government sought records in the possession of foreign banks. 116 The government could not access those records without the defendant's assistance. 117 It needed the defendant to execute a directive to release the foreign bank records and compelled him to do so with a grand jury subpoena. 118 The directive was carefully written as to not make reference to a specific account, to a specific bank, to the existence of an account, or to an account owned by the defendant.
119 Thus signing the directive did not require the defendant to admit anything. 120 The defendant refused to sign the directive on self-incrimination grounds. 121 The Court rejected the defendant's claim and found that it was not sufficiently 108 Id. at 613-14. 109 See id. at 613 n.11. 110 See id. 111 The Court, although it did not explicitly show agreement with the district court, did not express disagreement with the lower court's statement that "[w]ith few exceptions enforcement of the subpoenas would compel [respondent] to admit that the records exist, that they are in his possession, and that they are authentic." Id. at 613 n.11 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). This seems to show that this initial burden is easily met in most cases. 112 Id. 127 The Court looked narrowly to whether signing the directive would require the defendant to "make a statement." 128 The directive made no statement as to whether evidence existed, and it did not "point the Government towards hidden accounts or otherwise provide information that will assist the prosecution in uncovering evidence."
129 Therefore, while incriminating, the directive was not testimonial. 130 Consequently, the defendant could not claim the privilege against self-incrimination.
d. United States v. Hubbell
The last time the Court addressed the act of production doctrine was in United States v. Hubbell. 132 Here, the defendant had entered into a plea bargain where he would provide the government with information relating to an ongoing investigation. 133 The prosecutor served the defendant with a subpoena calling for the production of eleven categories of documents.
134
The defendant then invoked his Fifth Amendment Privilege. 135 In response, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002, 136 with immunity for the production of the papers. 137 The defendant then produced 13,120 documents. 138 These documents led to a prosecution, despite the grant of immunity. 139 The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the indictment because 18 U.S.C. § 6002 immunized the defendant from future prosecutions. 140 The government argued that it did not need to offer immunity in the first place because the production was insufficiently testimonial. 141 The Court rejected this however, saying that the production of the 13,120 documents "was tantamount to answering a series of interrogatories asking the witness to disclose the existence and location of particular documents fitting certain broad descriptions." 142 The government then argued that the production of the documents was insufficiently testimonial because the defendant's control over the documents was a foregone conclusion. 143 The Court rejected this argument because prior to the defendant's production of the documents, the government did not have "any prior knowledge" that the documents existed. Because the facts of this case were so unfavorable to the government, the court failed to explain what it meant by "foregone conclusion," except that "whatever the scope of this 'foregone conclusion' rationale, the facts of this (3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee or a subcommittee of either House, and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this title, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. 137 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 31. 138 Id. 139 Id. 140 Id. at 46. In Kastigar, the Court interpreted this grant of immunity to be co-extensive with the privilege against self-incrimination such that the government cannot use either the testimony or the derivatives of the testimony in a future criminal action. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S 441, 453 (1972). The only permissible way that the government could successfully prosecute subsequent to granting immunity is if it is based on information independent of the immunized testimony. Id. at 460-61. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 does granted not total immunity to all subsequent prosecutions (i.e., "transactional immunity"). Id. at 462. Rather, once immunity has been granted, the burden shifts to the prosecution to show that proposed evidence comes from an independent source. Id. at 461-62. In Hubbell, the documents themselves were not going to be used against the defendant, they were the "first step in a chain of evidence" leading to the indictment. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 42. Thus the government had made derivational use of the documents and could not show that it had attained the information necessary for these second prosecutions from an independent source. Id. at 45-46. 141 Few courts have thus far had the opportunity to address whether the compelled decryption of an electronic device is testimonial. 145 The courts that have addressed the problem have made use of the act of production doctrine discussed in II.B.3. These "compelled production" cases are factually distinct from one another and so this Comment will briefly discuss the factual and procedural circumstances of the cases and how they have applied the act of production doctrine to compelled decryption.
In re Boucher
In re Boucher 146 was one of the first encryption cases. On December 17, 2006, the defendant passed through a routine border checkpoint and an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent searched his vehicle.
147
Within the vehicle, the ICE agent found a laptop computer. 148 He opened it to discover several thousand images, some of which were pornographic.
149
Among the prodigious amount of pornography, he found a file titled "2yo getting raped during diaper change." He was unable to open it. 150 However, he could see that the file had been opened in the past month. 151 A second ICE agent was then called in, this one an expert in child pornography.
152 He read the defendant his Miranda rights, which were waived. 153 The defendant told the agent that he downloaded a lot of 144 Id.; see also Doe I, 465 U.S. 605, 613-14 (1984) (holding that the defendant's possession and control of records was not a foregone conclusion but neglecting to further define the doctrine). Engaging in a bit of speculation as to what went in chambers on this point, Justice Stevens wrote both the dissent in Doe II and the majority opinion in Hubbell. Justice Stevens all but ignores Doe II (aside from his dissent), favoring Doe I and Fisher. Appearing to be no fan of the foregone conclusion doctrine, he dismisses the foregone conclusion saying "this 'foregone conclusion' rationale" with foregone conclusion in scare quotes. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44. Whether this marks a sign that a future Court would abandon the foregone conclusion approach is worth considering. Also worth considering is the fact that Justices Scalia and Thomas would abandon the entire act of production analysis in favor of a rule saying that the accused should never need to assist the government in one's own prosecution. pornography, and occasionally, would mistakenly download child pornography, but he would delete it upon discovery. 154 The agent then asked the defendant to show him the pornography. 155 The defendant complied and entered in a password into his "drive Z"-the agent did not see what the password was. 156 The agent looked through the computer and a found a video titled "preteen bondage," which appeared to depict an underage girl.
157 After finding even more child pornography, the defendant was then arrested and the computer was powered down.
158
When the computer was powered back on, law enforcement found it encrypted using PGP encryption software. 159 The software made the disk unreadable despite a Secret Service forensics expert's best efforts. 160 It could take years to decrypt. 161 The government then subpoenaed the defendant to hand over all documents that reflected the password to the laptop. 162 The court did not address the demand for papers because the government refined its request at a hearing and demanded that the defendant enter the password himself.
163
The government promised not to use the defendant's act of entering in the password against him. 164 The magistrate first determined that the act of entering in the password would be testimonial. 165 The act of entering in the password would communicate both the contents of the defendant's mind and that he had access to the device. 166 It did not matter to the court that the government had promised not to look at the password because the defendant would still implicitly communicate that he knew the password regardless of whether the government learned the actual password. 167 The magistrate concluded that the government did not meet its burden 154 . The government had no idea if any papers existed; therefore production of the papers would implicitly communicate the existence of such papers-a testimonial act. 164 Id. 165 Id. at *3-4. 166 Id. 167 Id.
under the foregone conclusion doctrine. 168 The court interpreted the government's requests as either for the password itself or for the production of the files from drive Z. 169 A request for the password itself would be a request for something purely communicative and so the act of production doctrine would not apply. 170 The request for the files from drive Z would fail because the government only knew of some of the device's files and did not know the entire contents of the device.
171 Therefore, decryption would increase the "sum total" of the government's knowledge.
In In re Boucher 172 (Boucher II), the government appealed the magistrate's order to the district court judge. 173 This time, the government had refined its request to just be for the unencrypted version of "drive z." 174 The district court found that the government's knowledge of the drive's existence, the defendant's control of the drive, and the drive's authenticity was a foregone conclusion.
175 Therefore, the decryption of the device could be compelled. 176 The district court disposed of the magistrate's argument, saying that the government did not need to know of the incriminating contents of the files. 178 a case from the District of Colorado, also resulted in the defendant being compelled to decrypt because of the foregone conclusion doctrine. 179 In this case, the prosecution sought files contained in an encrypted laptop computer, which resisted FBI attempts at decryption. 180 The prosecution petitioned the court for a writ compelling the 168 Id. at *5-6. 169 Id. defendant to decrypt the computer and assist with the execution of the warrant.
181
The district court considered two issues. 182 The first was whether the government knew of the existence and location of the computer's files. 183 The court relied in large part on the Boucher II court's analysis to find that the government did not need to be able to know specific content of the files; knowing the "existence and location" of the computer's files was sufficient.
184
The second issue was whether the government could show that the defendant could access the computer. 185 On this point the court found: "[T]he government has met its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the [device] belongs to [the defendant], or, in the alternative, that she was its sole or primary user, who, in any event, can access the encrypted contents of that laptop computer." 186 The court relied on the following facts: (1) the computer had been seized from the defendant's room; (2) the computer was named "RS.WORKGROUP.Romana" (Romana being the defendant's first name); and (3) the agents had recorded a conversation between the defendant and her husband where the defendant admitted to owning and being able to access the laptop.
187 Therefore, the court found that the compelled decryption of the laptop did not violate the Fifth Amendment. 183 Id. 184 Id. 185 Id. 186 Id. In my research, the Fricosu court is the only court to identify a preponderance of the evidence standard as the burden the government must meet before it may compel decryption. The Fricosu court does not cite any authority in stating that the government must meet this burden. No other court has addressed or accepted this standard of proof requirement. However, as the Eleventh Circuit has noted, the foregone conclusion doctrine bears a resemblance to the independent source doctrine from Kastigar. See Doe In 2010, the FBI investigated a YouTube.com account suspected of sharing child pornography. 190 The user of the account accessed the account from three different internet protocol addresses (IP address). The FBI linked these addresses to three different hotels. 191 The only common individual staying in the hotels during the relevant times was the defendant. 192 The FBI executed a search warrant and seized two laptops and five external hard drives. 193 However, the hard drives had been encrypted using TruCrypt's Hidden Volume software. 194 One of the features of the Hidden Volume software is that it prevents one from determining whether an encrypted device is empty or full. 195 The device could be either full of information or completely empty (aside from the encryption) and no one could know the difference.
196
The government sought to subpoena the decryption of a device that it suspected had child pornography on it. 197 The defendant refused and claimed his privilege against self-incrimination. 198 The prosecution then offered use immunity 199 for the act of decryption but not for the derivational evidence. 200 The defendant again refused, claiming that use immunity would be insufficient to protect him from incriminating himself. 201 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the defendant and held that the defendant's act of decryption was testimonial and the grant of use immunity was insufficient to immunize the defendant's action. 202 The Eleventh Circuit first provided a broad overview of the Supreme Court's act of production doctrine. 203 It identified that an act is nontestimonial if either the compulsion is merely with regard to a physical act and is non-communicative or the compulsion is communicative but this communication is a foregone conclusion. 204 The court held first that decryption was a testimonial act. 205 Decryption would require the defendant to admit that he knew the files existed and knew the location of the files. 206 Decryption would also require him to admit to possessing the files, controlling the files, being able to access the files, and being able to decrypt the device.
207
The court then turned to whether the implicit testimony was a foregone conclusion. 208 On this point, the court put heavy emphasis on the government's expert whom, during a hearing, was unable to say whether the encrypted device actually had anything on it. 209 The most he could say was that the device could have files on it, but TrueCrypt's Hidden Volume functionality prevented one from determining whether a device was full or empty. 210 The court held that the foregone conclusion rationale was inapplicable because the government could not show that it knew any files even existed [Vol. 10:767 (let alone where they were located). 211 The government argued that the files could exist, but the court dismissed the argument stating that "the Government physically possesses the media devices, but it does not know what, if anything, is held on the encrypted drives." 212 Nor could the government show that it knew within any degree of certainty that the defendant could decrypt. 213 Thus, the court reasoned, the case was like Hubbell and unlike Fisher because the government lacked knowledge of the encrypted files. 214 The Eleventh Circuit distinguished, but did not show disagreement with, both Boucher II and Fricosu. In those cases, unlike this one, the prosecution at least had information that something was on the computer. 215 The Eleventh Circuit seemed to agree with the other courts that the government did not need to go so far as to show knowledge of the specific content of other devices. 216 But the government at least needed to know that something existed on the drive. 217 Specifically, the government would need to be able to show that a file did exist, either because it knew the account's name or because it knew "that (1) the file existed in some specific location, (2) the file is possessed by the target of the subpoena, and (3) the file is authentic." (Feldman) In In re Decryption of a Seized Storage System 219 (Feldman) , the prosecution sought to compel the decryption of several external hard drives seized during a search of the defendant's home. 220 The government believed the devices seized contained child pornography, and the forensic examiners were able to determine that they had transferred over 1,000 files over the file sharing network E-mule. 221 Most of the file names implicated child pornography.
In re Decryption of a Seized Storage System

222
The magistrate adopted the standards set by the other courts, and 211 looked, first, to determine whether the government knew the device had content, and, second, whether the defendant could access the device. 223 On this first point, the court, distinguishing Doe III, found that it was a foregone conclusion that the device had contents and that the contents were child pornography. 224 On the second point however, the court concluded that the government could not show that the defendant was able to decrypt the device and thus held the government could not compel decryption. 225 On reconsideration however, the government was able to present more evidence that the defendant was able to access the device. 226 This evidence was in a somewhat similar form as the evidence the court considered in Fricosu and included circumstantial evidence linking the defendant to the device, thus increasing the likelihood that the defendant could decrypt. 227 The court then ordered decryption. 228 Litigation on this issue abruptly ceased however when the prosecution was able to fully decrypt the defendant's computer, finding over four hundred thousand pictures and videos of child pornography.
229
III. ANALYSIS
The current collection of compelled decryption cases have some general similarities. Almost every major court case has turned on the issue of whether the foregone conclusion doctrine applies. 230 In other words, in these cases, the accused met his or her initial burden of showing that decryption was a testimonial act, and the government has sought to show that the implicit communications were a foregone conclusion. 232 This assumption misreads the act of production line of cases and fails to take into account the seemingly obvious fact that decryption and the physical production of documents are different actions. Different actions will implicitly communicate different things.
First, I will argue that decryption communicates that a witness can access a device. Second, I will argue that decryption does not communicate the existence of a device's contents or accused's control over of those contents. Therefore, to compel decryption, it must be a foregone conclusion that a witness is able to access a device. However, neither existence nor control needs to be a foregone conclusion.
A. Decryption Communicates that One Has Access to an Encrypted Device
Decrypting a device necessarily requires one enter a correct password. 233 Thus if the government seizes an encrypted device, compels the accused to decrypt the device, and the accused does so, it necessarily means that the accused knows the password and has access to the device. 234 This should be enough to establish that decryption is testimonial.
Boucher I, Doe III, and Feldman explicitly acknowledged that decryption communicates one's ability to access a device. 235 This is a unique feature of encryption and inapplicable to more "traditional" act of production doctrine cases. The court in Fricosu did not explicitly say that decryption had testimonial qualities but instead jumped to the foregone conclusion analysis. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1237. During its foregone conclusion analysis, it noted that existence and control were both foregone conclusions so the court at least assumed that decryption presumptively communicated these qualities. Id.; see also id. at 1236 (discussing Boucher and the court's analysis there).
233 See generally section II.A supra. 234 For the purposes of clarity, the general noun used for the one the government is attempting to compel will either be the witness, the defendant, or the accused. This is not to indicate that anyone compelled to decrypt is necessarily filling one of those roles. 235 into a computer-different actions will have different implicit communications. 237 For example, in Hubbell the government sought to compel the defendant to physically assemble thousands of documents. 238 In comparison, in Doe II, the government sought to compel the defendant to execute a directive that would provide the government access to potential evidence. 239 In Hubbell, the defendant communicated that the documents existed, were controlled by him, and were authentic. 240 In Doe II, all the defendant communicated was an ability to write. 241 While the end result remained the same, the government got access to incriminating documents, the defendants' actions differed significantly and thus made different implicit communications. This is not to say that because the act of decryption has fundamental differences from the act of production that courts should not apply the Fisher line of cases. Instead, courts should embrace the differences between decryption and production and acknowledge these differences in their analysis.
B. Before the Government May Compel Decryption, the Defendant's Ability to Access the Device Must Be a Foregone Conclusion
Simply because a witness is able to meet his or her initial burden of showing that the act of decryption is testimonial does not mean the analysis is over.
242 The next step is to consider whether the government can produce sufficient evidence to show the defendant's ability to decrypt is a forgone conclusion. 243 If the defendant's ability to decrypt is a foregone conclusion, then the defendant would "add little or nothing to the sum total of the government's information by conceding" to the fact that the defendant can [Vol. 10:767 decrypt. 244 Courts addressing this issue, in one way or another, have considered whether the defendant's ability to access an encrypted device is a foregone conclusion. 245 The clearest example of a defendant's ability to decrypt being a foregone conclusion is Boucher where a government agent watched the defendant decrypt his computer once before. 246 In comparison, in Doe III, the government put forward no evidence that the defendant was able to decrypt. 247 Fricosu and Feldman present an interesting middle ground where the courts' decisions were based on circumstantial evidence.
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Once the government shows that the accused's ability to decrypt is a foregone conclusion, then "no constitutional rights are touched." 249 However, courts have also said that the content and control of a device must also be a foregone conclusion. But, as I will argue, decryption does not communicate content and control and so requiring these things to be a foregone conclusion is erroneous.
C. Decryption Does Not Communicate the Existence of a Device's Contents
Along with requiring the government to know that the witness can decrypt, every court has required that the government be able to know that the device contains information. 250 The Fricosu court adopted an evidentiary standard where the government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is able to decrypt. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1236. The Feldman court did not follow this evidentiary standard expressly; it did not say what evidentiary standard it was applying. Feldman II, 2013 BL 153162, at *2. This Comment is consciously avoiding the question of how much knowledge the government must have before something becomes a foregone conclusion. However, I am concerned that a "preponderance of the evidence" standard could result in injustice. There is a possibility that one could be compelled to decrypt a device that one does not have access to. For instance, if there are multiple users to a device, one user could have an inability to access a particular area or volume of a device. See Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1340 n.9 ("[T]here was no evidence that [the defendant] was the only person who had access to his hard drives."). Holding that person in contempt for being unable to do the impossible would result in a serious injustice. Decryption is different than physically producing documents. This is perhaps an obvious point-but an important one nonetheless-because different actions will implicitly communicate different things. Entering in a password to decrypt will implicitly communicate something different from physically going out and searching for documents and producing them in response to a subpoena.
This premise is rooted in the Supreme Court's cases. 251 In Hubbell and Fisher, the Court indicated that production of documents implicitly communicates that the documents existed and the accused controlled the documents.
252 Importantly though, it was the means by which the accused would produce the documents that communicated existence and control. 253 The Court in Hubbell put great weight on the fact that the accused would have had to "make extensive use 'of the contents of his own mind' in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the request in the subpoena."
254 The "assembly" of the documents resulted in the act being testimonial. 255 Conversely, in Doe II, the accused did not need to go out and assemble any documents-he just executed a directive-and so the accused did not implicitly communicate existence and control of the documents to the government. 256 Decryption is more like executing a release for foreign bank records than the assembly of documents. 257 In both executing a release and decryption, the accused is not required to use the contents of his mind to . 253 Id. 254 Id. 255 Id. ("The assembly of those documents was like telling an inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like being forced to surrender the key to a strongbox.") (emphasis added); see also Cole, supra note 75, at 182 ("The Court concluded that the mental efforts required by a witness to assemble and produce subpoenaed documents was like testifying to the combination to a wall safe . . . ."). 256 himself or herself but instead is required to allow the government to read the device.
267
The major distinguishing feature between decryption and executing the bank records is that, as I have already discussed, decryption implicitly communicates that the accused has access to the device. But the directive in Doe II was carefully written as to not communicate that the accused had access to the foreign bank accounts.
268
This distinction goes away when the accused's ability to access the device is a foregone conclusion. The Supreme Court said the execution of the directive in Doe II was like a handwriting exemplar. 269 The Court has also said that an exemplar has testimonial qualities, but that these testimonial qualities are almost always a foregone conclusion. 270 Thus if it is a foregone conclusion that one is able to decrypt, then the act of decryption is really no different, at least in testimonial value, from a handwriting exemplar.
D. Decryption Does Not Communicate Possession or Control of a Device
Decryption of a device does not communicate either that one has control of contents of a device or possession of a device. In Fisher, one necessarily had to have possession or control over the subpoenaed documents to produce them for the government. 271 However, decryption is distinct in several ways. First, someone using encryption can tell someone else the password to one's encrypted device. That third-party can certainly decrypt but does not necessarily have control or possession of the device. Second, usually in these decryption cases, the government possesses and controls the device because it was seized. The accused does not have control over the device but instead can access it. Third, in Doe II, the Supreme Court never required the government to know that the defendant had control of the foreign bank records before compelling the execution of the directive. 272 Similarly, in entering in a password, one does not implicitly say that one has control over the device's contents. 267 See Phillip R. Reitinger, supra note 257, at 177-78. 268 Doe II, 487 U.S. 201, 215 (1988 
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The Eleventh Circuit, for instance, adopted a rule requiring that the government know of the existence of some files before compelling decryption. 274 But the government, in these cases, is seeking decryption of the entire device-not the production of certain files. 275 The Eleventh Circuit seems to be saying that so long as the government has knowledge of some files it can compel the decryption of the entire device. 276 The Supreme Court in Hubbell did not say that if the government knew of the existence of some documents, it could successfully compel the production of an entire category of documents. 277 The lower court's analysis, if applied consistently with Hubbell, would permit unconstitutional fishing expeditions. 278 A consistent application of Hubbell would require the defendant to produce specific files and not the entire content of a device. Alternatively, courts should require a comprehensive listing of every file on a device, or require the prosecution provide use and derivational use immunity for those files it does not know about prior to compelling decryption. Fortunately however, these remedies are not necessary because the premise that decryption communicates contents is incorrect.
IV. A NEW ACT OF DECRYPTION DOCTRINE
I have argued that decryption implicitly communicates that one is able to decrypt but does not communicate the contents of a device or one's control of a device. Following from this, if the witness's ability to decrypt is a foregone conclusion, then decryption is a non-testimonial act. This nontestimonial act would allow the government to gain access to a potential source of information, but would not assist the government in locating or compiling evidence.
I suggest a two part analysis. First, courts should ask whether the act of decryption is presumptively privileged. As discussed in part III.A, the act of entering the password is generally going to be testimonial-it implicitly communicates an ability to access the device.
For the privilege to attach however, decryption must also be compelled and incriminating. In some cases, decryption may not be compelled. For example, one can voluntarily decrypt either during custodial interrogation 279 or during a grand jury proceeding. 280 Similarly, one's act of decryption is not always incriminating. If the danger of self-incrimination is "imagined and unsubstantial," then the government has the power to compel a testimonial act. 281 For example, if the defendant has child pornography on his or her computer and a witness saw the defendant enter in the password, the witness could be compelled to decrypt the device because there would be no danger that decryption would incriminate the witness. Alternatively, if the government grants immunity for the act of decryption, then one's act is no longer incriminatory and can be compelled.
If the defendant can meet the initial burden of showing that decryption is (1) testimonial, (2) compelled, and (3) incriminatory, then the privilege against self-incrimination attaches. However, as the Court in Doe I stated, the government then can offer evidence to show that the defendant's ability to decrypt is a foregone conclusion. If the government can meet this burden, then, it may compel the witness to decrypt the device because decryption would not increase the "sum total" of the government's knowledge.
One could argue that the act of decryption analysis above may permit the government to compel decryption as part of fishing expeditions. In other words, because the government is not required to know anything about the contents of a device, it could compel decryption and ransack the device should one's ability to decrypt be a foregone conclusion. This would implicate privacy interests along with granting the government an overbroad power to search one's personal, digital effects.
In response, the discussion here is just in regard to the Fifth Amendment. There are other protections and parts of the Constitution; the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination is just one check against government power.
282 The Fourth Amendment for example still restrains the government's ability to search one's digital devices. 283 Additionally, the Fifth Amendment's concern is not that of privacy. 284 The Court has recognized that the government's access to a person's papers is mostly unfettered regardless of a paper's personal nature so long as the Fourth Amendment requirements are met. 285 Similarly, having private information contained on a computer is irrelevant for a Fifth Amendment analysis.
V. AN UNSOLVABLE PROBLEM: THE ACCUSED'S REFUSAL TO DECRYPT As this Comment argues, the law is equipped to adjudicate whether a 282 Cf. Doe II, 487 U.S. 201, 214 (1988) ("[I]t should be remembered that there are many restrictions on the government's prosecutorial practices in addition to the Self-Incrimination Clause. Indeed, there are other protections against governmental efforts to compel an unwilling suspect to cooperate in an investigation, including efforts to obtain information from him. We are confident that these provisions, together with the Self-Incrimination Clause, will continue to prevent abusive investigative techniques.") (footnotes omitted).
283 U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 284 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1976) ("The proposition that the Fifth Amendment protects private information obtained without compelling self-incriminating testimony is contrary to the clear statements of this Court that under appropriate safeguards private incriminating statements of an accused may be overheard and used in evidence, if they are not compelled at the time they were uttered, and that disclosure of private information may be compelled if immunity removes the risk of incrimination. If the Fifth Amendment protected generally against the obtaining of private information from a man's mouth or pen or house, its protections would presumably not be lifted by probable cause and a warrant or by immunity. The privacy invasion is not mitigated by immunity; and the Fifth Amendment's strictures, unlike the Fourth's, are not removed by showing reasonableness. The Framers addressed the subject of personal privacy directly in the Fourth Amendment. They struck a balance so that when the State's reason to believe incriminating evidence will be found becomes sufficiently great, the invasion of privacy becomes justified and a warrant to search and seize will issue. They did not seek in still another Amendment the Fifth to achieve a general protection of privacy but to deal with the more specific issue of compelled self-incrimination."); see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 401) (" [T] he Supreme Court's more recent opinions indicate that Boyd's foundations have eroded. The Court no longer views the Fifth Amendment as a general protector of privacy or private information, but leaves that role to the Fourth Amendment. . . . Self-incrimination analysis now focuses on whether the creation of the thing demanded was compelled and, if not, whether the act of producing it would constitute compelled testimonial communication."); Doe I, 465 U.S. 605, 610 n.6 (1984); Terzian, supra note 1, at 307. 285 See cases cited supra note 284. I say mostly because other privileges may apply. For example, attorney-client privilege, attorney work product, or perhaps some kind of exception applying to national security. defendant may be compelled to decrypt. The law, however, is not equipped to address what happens after the compulsion. The accused in such situations faces two possibilities: decrypt and allow the government access to the evidence or not decrypt and face contempt of court. 286 While a defendant in contempt can be incarcerated, the device remains encrypted. This hinders law enforcement's ability to use the contents of the device to investigate further crimes such as during a child pornography investigation where the government is seeking the child pornography distributor.
When one is compelled to decrypt, one could say that he or she forgot the password. The defendant in Fricosu, after the court ordered her to decrypt her device, "claimed" to have forgotten the password. 287 Whether that claim is true or not is nearly impossible to determine, but the more time that passes, the more likely it is to become true. If the defendant cannot remember the password and can no longer decrypt, then the coercive purpose of contempt would become inapplicable. Holding such a person in contempt would do nothing more than coerce him or her to do something that he or she is unable to accomplish, possibly opening up a defense of impossibility.
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One may choose contempt over decryption to avoid conviction for a sufficiently serious crime. 289 One scholar has suggested a missing witness instruction as a means to deal with the problem of a refusal to decrypt. 290 This suggestion could help solve the problem of a refusal to decrypt in some cases but not all. For example, in a case where the specific nature of the records is important to investigate a crime, a missing witness instruction may not be helpful. Also, the content of a drive may be important to future investigations, such as finding the distributor of child pornography. Alternatively, in a situation where there are national security risks, prosecution is of secondary importance to decryption and preventing catastrophe.
Some have argued for increased regulation of encryption technology. 291 First of all, this argument has First Amendment problems.
But as a more practical matter, the nature of online distribution and the existence of free and open source encryption software make strict regulation a losing proposition. 293 Regardless, for all this discussion of compelled decryption, courts may be better off not going down the compelled decryption road. Instead, the solution to these problems lies in technological advancements in cryptology, computer science, and law enforcement techniques.
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Between writing the Comment and being selected for publication, another important compelled decryption case was decided, Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt.
294 Gelfgatt, a 6-2 decision holding the Commonwealth could compel decryption, displays the importance carefully considering the differences between the product of documents and decryption. 295 In this case, the defendant was accused of several counts of forgery, fraud, and larceny. He had encrypted several electronic storage devices.
296
The Commonwealth believed evidence of the defendant's crimes could be found on those devices. 297 The defendant had informed law enforcement that the devices were encrypted and that he could decrypt, but he refused to do so. 298 The Massachusetts Supreme Court's analysis follows that of Doe III, Boucher, and Fricosu (though includes few citations to those cases). 299 First, it determined that "at first blush" entering in the password is sufficiently communicative to trigger Fifth Amendment protection. 300 However, it stated the foregone conclusion exception permitted decryption if the government could show that it knew "(1) the existence of the evidence demanded; (2) the possession or control of that evidence by the defendant; and (3) the authenticity of the evidence." 301 The court concluded that these facts were a foregone conclusion, in part, because of the defendant's own statements indicating he could decrypt if he wanted to.
302
Although the court does not say it clearly, it does seem to indicate that it is sufficient that the government knew that: (1) the defendant had control over the devices; (2) the device was encrypted, and (3) the defendant knew the encryption key.
303
Curiously missing from the majority's analysis is a discussion of the government's knowledge as to the existence of evidence on the device and the defendant's control over that evidence. 304 In fact, the dissent criticizes the majority saying,
[T]he court adopts the Commonwealth's contention that, by decrypting the computers and thereby producing their unencrypted contents, the defendant would be asserting only his ability to decrypt the devices. On this view, he would not be asserting that he owned them, had exclusive use and control of them, or was familiar with any files on them; that certain files contained the incriminating evidence sought; or that the documents were authentic. 305 Here, the dissent is correct in recognizing that, notwithstanding the majority's own characterization of the rule, the majority was focused on whether it was a foregone conclusion that the defendant could decrypt and not the other act of production doctrine requirements.
As this Comment argues, decryption does not implicitly communicate exclusive use, control, or familiarity with files contained within a device. If the production of physical documents were anything like compelled decryption, the dissent would be correct to chastise the majority. But it is not. 300 Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d at 614. 301 The confused analysis in this case displays the need for a more careful consideration of the act of production doctrine's relationship to compelled decryption. The majority's decision was messy, but perhaps the reason it was messy is that it would not make sense to strictly apply the act of production doctrine to compelled decryption cases without recognizing the differences between decryption and production.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that the lower courts are applying the Supreme Court's act of production doctrine improperly. The courts have failed to recognize that the witness is not, himself, producing anything at all-not in the same way that a defendant produced things in Hubbell, Fisher, and Doe I. Rather, the witness is typing in a password. So long as it is a foregone conclusion that the witness knows the password, the government should be able to compel the witness to enter it. Because the lower courts have misapplied the doctrine, they have provided greater protection for encryption users than what the Constitution requires. This Comment's intent is not to advocate for a limitation on an individual's interest in not incriminating himself or herself but to assist in the creation of a clear rule for when the privilege does or does not apply.
In the end, should someone not wish to decrypt, the government cannot do much to get access to the encrypted material. Although this Comment has argued for clarification in the law, I am unconvinced that the law will have much to do with battling the growing problem with encryption. Judges, prosecutors, academics, and Congress will not solve this problem; cryptographers, forensic investigators, computer scientists, and law enforcement will solve the problem.
